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OBITER DICTA
"An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*
"AT HoME, ABROAD"
America has again demonstrated its penchant for the unusual. The house on wheels,
more familiarly, called a trailer, is gaining widespread use. Witness the exhibits at
the recent automobile shows; a casual glance at our high.
ways will confirm this popularity. As necessarily follows
A
from any innovation which affects a great portion of society,
Trailer
Jurisprudence? legal regulation is contemplated and, in some instances, has
already been effected. The New York Joint Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation recently invited delegates from nine states to a
conference to discuss measures tending to promote health and safety in the use of
trailers. New York Times, March 14, 1937, Sec. II, p. 1. Apart from sanitation,
safety and traffic problems, this increasingly popular vehicle presents interesting
questions of substantive law.
The determination as to whether this hybrid is to be considered a house or vehicle
was involved in a recent ruling construing a municipal housing ordinance. It was
held to be the former, and its owner was found guilty of failing to comply with a regulation requiring a human dwellHouse
ing to contain a certain amount of cubic feet per occuor
pant. City of Pontiac, Mich. v. Gumarsol, New York Sun,
Vehicle?
Nov. 13, 1936, p. 21. It is doubtful whether this sole ruling
on the question will control when other problems arise. In the law of searches and
seizures, for example, the issue is squarely presented. Would a warrant be necessary
to conduct a valid search of a trailer in the light of Carrollv. United States, 267 U. S.
132 (1925), holding that none is required to search a moving vehicle provided that
reasonable belief exists that a crime has been committed? Or would the rule of
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925), to the effect that a warrant is necessary to search a private dwelling, prevail? It would seem that the doctrine of the
Carroll case, founded upon the fact that the vehicle might be quickly moved out of
the jurisdiction and thus prevent search and seizure of evidence, would be applicable
in the case of a trailer in motion. Sed quere, would this rule be extended to a
trailer permanently at rest?
Prolific in possibilities of potential problems is the field of Conflict of Laws. The
nomadic urge which prompts one to abandon his house and take to the open road
would seem to negate the requisite intent to set up a domicile
in any new locale. However, it is possible to argue that one
Domicile
might acquire a new domicile with each extended stay; the
in
presentation of evidence required in such a case to overTransitu
come the rule, that one retains his domicile until a new one
is acquired, might be exceedingly arduous. Jurisdictional questions in actions to
probate wills, to administer intestate estates or to protest taxes might conceivably
become hopelessly ensnarled with contradictory evidence. Matrimonial problems
*BnU=,
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resting on domicile will be faced with similar difficulty. Strongly indicative that
ours is an age of speed is the fact that the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of
Laws, though completed but three years ago, is silent on the status of the trailer. It
contemplates a situation wherein one makes his home in a "boat, car, van, or other
vehicle," but unfortunately the rule enunciated is limited to a case where the vehicle
regularly remains in a particular place for a considerable time each year; that place
designates the domicile. RESTATMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF L WS (1934)
§17.
Prophetic of future popularity is the prediction that by the end of 1937 there will
be 1,000,000 trailers with 3,000,000 users. 15 FORTUNE (Mfarch, 1937) 107. Can it
be that as a result a return to the law of the tribe will be necessary? An application
of this personal rather than territorial law, long used to govern itinerant peoples
[Matter of Patterson, 245 N. Y. 433, 157 N. E. 734 (1927)], might solve some of
the difficulties presented by widespread trailer use since tribal law, reminiscent of
Roman law, follows the individual whither he wanders. Truly then, in situ as well as
in transitu, the trailer-nomad would be "at home abroad."

TRIAL By BATTLE

When the contract to engage in a prize-fight in New York on June 3rd, was
signed by both Champion James J. Braddock and Max Schmeling, a titanic struggle
was promised by the newspapers. But it appears no, that
the spring air will reverberate with the blow of the judicial
The Gage
gavel upon the rostrum rather than with the thud of leather
is
or the roar of the crowd. Braddock has agreed to another
Thrown Down
contest with the young boxer, Joe Louis on June 22nd in
Chicago, only nineteen days after his scheduled bout with Schmeling. Because of
this, the New York promoters seek legal redress and another equally ancient and
contentious profession becomes interested.
Lawyers for the Madison Square Garden Corporation, promoter of the first contest, threatened proceedings for "anticipatory breach of contract." The widely
cited case of Hochster v. De L% Tour, 2 El. & BL. 678, 118 Eng. Reprints 922
(K. B. 1853) first pointed the way to this action. And in Frost v. Knight, L. R.
7 Exch. 111 (1872) Cockburn, J., said "The promisee has an inchoate right to the
performance of the bargain, which becomes complete when the time for performance
has arrived. In the meantime he has the right to have the contract kept open
as a subsisting and effective contract. Its unimpaired efficacy may be essential to
his interests." This quotation might be considered quite apt by the Garden Corporation. In New York, the theory of anticipatory breach is well settled and is applicable
to cases dealing with personal services. Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362 (1875).
Whether injunctive relief in equity is also available to the promoter is debatable.
Braddock had agreed not to fight Louis before June 3rd. Theoretically, this stipulation is not violated nor is his contest with Schmeling affected
by his agreement to box on June 23rd. Had the Louis
The
fight been scheduled prior to June 3rd, injunctive relief
Armwry
would have been granted. Even in the absence of the
Is Opened
express stipulation, the doctrine of negative covenants as
expounded in Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G. Al. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Reprints 687
(Ch. 1852) would apply. However a court of equity would not enforce the affirmative contract to fight Schmeling since contracts for personal services are not specifically enforcible in equity. The issuance of an injunction restraining Braddock
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from the Chicago encounter would impel him to go through with his New York
date, but the fact of the nineteen day period separating the two dates argues none
too well for the injunction.

While much of the controversy has centered about Braddock, it might be well
to examine the status of the Chicago promoter, who might be termed the "causa
causans." There are authorities holding one, who interferes
The Champions with a contract, liable to the party injured by such interference. Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871); London
Enter the
Guarantee Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N. E. 526 (1903).
Lists
Indeed in a case somewhat akin in its facts, the plaintiff
-was a contract breaker who was suing the interferer, and Glennon, J., thought that
the defendant "may have been guilty of a wrong for inducing the plaintiff to repudiate his agreement." Budd v. Morning Telegraph, 241 App. Div. 142, 145, 271 N. Y.
Supp. 538, 542 (1st Dep't 1934). Perhaps the whole affair would be most appropriately settled by invoking that hoary procedure of the common law, sanctioned
-when knighthood was in flower and justice more exciting. Let us have a "trial by
battle" immediately-according to the rules of chivalry. "Marshal, let the trumpets sound-set forward combatants."

